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We conduct an empirical study on how 22 donors allocate their bilateral aid among 147 recipient 
countries over the 1970-2004 period to investigate whether recent changes in the international 
aid architectureat the international and country levelhave led to changes in donor behavior. 
We find that after the fall of the Berlin Wall and especially in the late nineties, bilateral aid 
responds more to economic needs and the quality of a country’s policy and institutional 
environment and less to debt, size and colonial and political linkages. We also find more 
selectivity by donors when a country uses a PRSP and passes the HIPC decision point.  
Importantly, PRSPs and HIPCs reduce the perverse effects of large bilateral and multilateral debt 
shares on aid flows, suggesting less defensive lending. Overall, it appears certain international 
aid architecture changes have led to more selectivity in aid allocations. The specific factors 
causing these changes remain unclear, however.  And since there remain (large) differences 
among donors in selectivity that appear to relate to donors’ own institutional environments, 
reforms will have to be multifaceted.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The so-called international financial architecture stands for the rules, institutional framework, 
and institutions covering both private and official flows. Following the financial crises of the 
1990s, there have been many changes in the international financial architecture. These include, 
among others, new standards to which countries can adhere in their financial and other business 
dealings (such as the Basle Core Principles for Banking Supervision and the IMF Code of Good 
Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies), the adoption of collective action 
clauses in sovereign bond issues covering events of liquidity and solvency problems, and 
changes in international financial institutions’ lending policies. In addition, and especially since 
the fall of the Berlin wall, there have been many changes to the international aid architecture, 
which can be defined as the subset of international financial architecture rules and institutions 
affecting aid flows, including the way in which (bilateral and multilateral) aid is being allocated, 
the mix of official aid and debt flows, the use of official debt reduction and the accompanying 
policy requirements.   
 
As part of a broader research program, we are interested in both how these changes have come 
about and how they are affecting actual behavior. In this paper, we study the way in which aid is 
being provided by donor countries to individual recipient countries and how this varies over time 
to see whether institutional changes have had some impact on donors and other aid agencies. 
Specifically, we investigate whether institutional, country-specific and other changes to the 
international aid architecture have led to significantly different ways in which bilateral aid is 
being allocated over time. We also explore differences among donors in terms of determinants of 
aid flows. Aid allocation practice lends itself well to a study of how changes in the international 
financial architecture affect actual behavior for at least two reasons. First, data on aid are 
relatively easily available for long periods of time for a large number of donors and a large set of 
recipient countries. This allows for combining longitude and cross-sectional empirical studies on 
the allocation of aid. Second, the aid system has been undergoing many changes in the last few 
years, with policy changes at both the bilateral and multilateral donor levels and actions at the 
individual recipient country level. As such, we can expect to be able to find and document how 
changes in the international aid architecture affect actual behavior in the international financial 
system. 
 
Research on aid can also have significant policy influence, as shown in part by the effects of the 
academic work on aid effectiveness. Initiated as academic research (Burnside and Dollar, 2000) 
and rallied by the World Bank study on ‘Assessing Aid’ (1998), that showed that aid works 
(better) in good policy and institutional environments, it has become accepted—at least among 
policy makers—that targeting aid to those countries with an enabling environment maximizes 
overall aid effectiveness. Although some of this research has been questioned as to its empirical 2 
robustness,
1 it has led to the view that aid ought to be considered only for the ‘needy’ and the 
‘deserving’ (as used in Nunnenkamp and Thiele, 2006), notwithstanding what the exact 
definition of these two concepts is.  At the same time, the overall consensus on aid allocation, an 
already well-studied topic and supported by much recent research, has been that, at least in the 
past, aid has not been allocated in the most effective way with full concern to the needy’ and the 
‘deserving’ objectives, or perhaps to development objectives in general.  
 
These new (research) insights on aid effectiveness and aid allocation have resulted in major 
changes in the international aid architecture, such that aid scholars have started to refer to these 
changes as a “paradigm shift” (Renard, 2006). Changes in the international aid architecture have 
largely aimed to increase the development efficiency and effectiveness of aid allocations. 
Architectural changes range from specific actions such as more debt relief for a larger number of 
poor countries to other, far broader ‘institutional’ changes, such as a greater move away from 
project lending towards programmatic lending, a greater emphasis on coordination among 
donors, more ownership by the recipient country (including beyond the government), and the so-
called ‘alignment’ including greater harmonization of lending terms and policies. It has been 
accompanied by changes in the development approach more generally, including a greater use of 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), the explicit introduction of Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), and enumeration of the objective of scaling up aid.   
 
This new environment very much aims to affect the allocation of aid among countries through 
several channels. Recipient countries that abide by the new paradigm should see themselves 
rewarded with more aid, also at more concessional terms. It has been accompanied by much 
bilateral and multilateral debt reduction. This debt reduction was in part motivated to reduce the 
pattern of “defensive” lending where more indebted countries have been receiving more aid 
flows to keep up payments to (multilateral) creditors (Birdsall et al., 2003). Institutional and 
policy changes should lead to fewer coordination problems, resulting in better aid allocation. 
And the quality of aid, e.g., in terms of the mix between project and program lending, and the 
accompanying technical assistance, should be higher. 
 
The exact effects of these changes in the design of the multilateral framework on actual aid 
allocation are not clear a priori, however, and have certainly not yet been studied much. The first 
and foremost question this paper therefore tries to address is whether there have been any 
significant changes in the actual behavior of donors in the most recent period compared to 
                                                 
1 Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004), for example, find that the Burnside and Dollar (2000) results do not stand 
up to a longer time period, when using exactly the same specifications. Many others have also come to question the 
results (Easterly, 2006 and Radelet, 2006 take a critical look at this research). Rajan and Subramanian (2005) argue 
that it is hard to find a robust effect of aid on the long-term growth of poor countries, even those with good policies, 
which they argue arises because aid inflows have systematic adverse effects on a country’s competitiveness, as 
reflected in a decline in the share of labor intensive and tradable industries in the manufacturing sector, stemming in 
part from the real exchange rate overvaluation caused by aid inflows.   3 
earlier periods. The key approach the paper will use to tackle this question is to investigate 
whether changes have led donors to provide aid money in a more rational manner, that is, do 
donors allocate aid now to “poorer” and “better” countries.  Specifically, we investigate whether 
donors in recent periods allocate aid with greater sensitivity to the income level and the quality 
of country policies and institutional environment, i.e., whether there is greater selectivity today 
compared to in the past. In terms of specific changes, we investigate whether the adoption of the 
‘Heavily Indebted Poor Countries’ (HIPC) debt reduction initiative, the introduction of the PRSP 
and the granting of bilateral and multilateral debt reduction, in general and for specific countries, 
have led to any improvements in the behavior of bilateral aid flows with regards to income, the 
quality of country policies and institutional environment, size, debt, and colonial and political 
linkages. As a corollary, we expect better allocations of aid to achieve a greater impact in terms 
of meeting the MDGs.   
 
In terms of methodology, we use panel data for the whole matrix of bilateral aid flows and 
explore the time variation in donor and recipient country behavior. Using this approach provides 
more power and allows for better estimations compared to cross-section regressions.  Policy 
changes may occur in gradual fashion, for example, and will certainly vary by donor country. 
Some countries may have done debt reduction early, some late. Furthermore, we can better 
control for other factors, such as the trade openness of the recipient country which has been 
found to be important for aid allocation.  
 
Our general finding is one suggestive of significant changes in the international aid architecture 
as the characteristics that drive the aid to specific countries from bilateral donors respond over 
time in different and better ways to economic fundamentals and policies. Our results confirm 
earlier studies that find an increase in selectivity by donors in the nineties, after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. We think that the recent changes in the aid architecture, such as the HIPC Initiative 
and the PRSP process, have led to this greater selectivity in donor flows. From our analysis, 
actions at the individual country level also seem to have improved aid allocation, with the 
adoption of PRSP and actual debt relief resulting not only in greater aid flows to the specific 
country, but also in a reduced importance of debt stocks and the share of official (multilateral) 
debt in determining aid flows across countries, suggesting the reduction of defensive lending. 
Although there remain significant differences among donors, we also find evidence of 
improvements in selectivity across a range of donors.  These effects are robust to various 
econometric specifications, reducing outliers, and alternative data samples.  
 
As such, we can interpret these findings as evidence of an improved international aid 
architecture.  While these are very encouraging signs, we are left unsure as to what specific 
institutional changes at the international or donor level may have been driving these changes in 
behavior.  Since the (large) differences among donors in selectivity appear to relate to donors’ 
own institutional environments, we suggest that reforms will have to be multifaceted and include 
changes to the political economy and accountability in donor countries. We therefore suggest 
further research is needed to identify specific institutional and other changes.   4 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the related literature. 
Section 3 describes the data and the methodology used. Section 4 provides a discussion of the 
results and the robustness checks.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
I.   RELATED LITERATURE 
The allocation of aid by (individual) donors among recipient countries has been a much analyzed 
topic (Radelet, 2006 and Easterly, 2006 provide general reviews on aid that include the aid 
allocation literature). There have numerous empirical studies on the allocation of aid among 
countries, starting at least as far back as the 1960s.
2  The impression, at least until the early 
1990s, was that political and strategic interests dominate concerns for growth, poverty reduction 
or other economic objectives. In other words, the general sense of these investigations was that 
donors allocated their own money with little concern to development impact.  Yet, little impetus 
for change existed until the fall of the Berlin wall, and the revitalization of the academic 
literature on the topic. 
 
The removal of the Iron Curtain and the breakdown of communism changed much in global 
relations, with consequences for international aid. The disappearance of the global power race 
reduced much of the political motivations for aid. Another development has been the rise in 
private capital flows and the progress in reform in many countries that in turn have reduced the 
need for and the nature of official aid.  Some countries, even though still poor, have reduced their 
dependency on aid as they have attracted private external capital flows. Others have made much 
progress in reducing poverty, reducing the need for aid.   
 
Another force has been academic research. The topic of aid allocation received much renewed 
attention from academics in recent years starting with the work of Alesina and Dollar (2000). 
This analysis, and confirmed by a now through a large literature, has provided solid evidence 
that, while aid is affected by economic considerations pertaining to the countries’ growth and 
poverty situation and prospects, non-economic factors also play a large role, with the role of 
global political economy factors particularly highlighted.  France, Great Britain and Japan, for 
example, were found by Alesina and Dollar (2000) to favor their former colonies in the 
dispersion of aid, and they, together with the US and Germany, allocate more aid to recipients 
that vote in unison with them in the UN. Also factors related to the correctness of the political 
regime in recipient countries do not seem to matter much: Alesina and Weder (2002) for 
example find no evidence that less corrupt governments would receive more aid. 
 
                                                 
2 Seminal early studies include Little & Clifford (1965), OECD (1969), Bhagwati (1972) and Dudley and 
Montmarquette (1976). McKinlay and Little (1977) introduced econometrics; Trumbull and Wall (1994) and Wall 
(1995) introduced panel data econometric techniques. 5 
In part as a consequence of the changes in geopolitical and global economic circumstances, and 
with the help of new insights from research, donor countries have since the mid-1990s been 
adapting their aid programs, altering many policies and possibly the patterns of their bilateral aid 
allocations. Some of the findings of the newer empirical studies already reveal (indirectly) how 
changes have altered the way (some) donor countries provide aid to countries. Dollar and Levin 
(2006), for example, examine the aid allocation by 41 donor agencies, bilateral as well as 
multilateral, computing poverty- and policy-selectivity indices for these individual donors for 
different sub-periods in the 1984-2002 period.  They conclude that indeed selectivity has 
increased with respect to economic governance.
3 Roodman (2005) also finds that there are 
improvements over time in donors’ behavior.  Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) investigate aid 
flows over 20 years (1980–1999) for 22 donors and 137 recipients.  When they compare aid 
allocation policies in the 1980s with those in the 1990s, they find that the end of the cold war has 
reduced the bias towards former colonial links and instead led donors to favor trade partners. 
Moreover, they find that donors seem to reward good economic policy outcomes more since 
1990.
4  Sundberg and Gelb (2006) show that poverty and policy selectivity of aid to Sub-Sahara 
Africa has improved over time, both for bilateral and multilateral donors. Most other studies also 
find that the sensitivity of aid flows with respect to income levels of the recipient has increased. 
A contrarian view comes from Easterly (2006) who does not find consistent evidence of 
increased selectivity with respect to economic policies, such as trade openness, and only 
temporarily increased selectivity in the late 1990s with respect to corruption.   
 
As a corollary to the aid allocation analysis, research has considered the (more) optimal 
allocation of aid from the point of view of reducing poverty and better achieving (some of) the 
MDGs.  Much research has focused on how to allocate aid so as to reduce world poverty, with 
White and McGillivray (1995) perhaps as the first attempt and the Collier and Dollar (2002) as 
the best known and most influential recent paper.
5 These and other papers try to analyze what 
allocation of aid across countries achieves the highest impact in term of global poverty reduction 
or other, MDG-related objectives.  Relevant for the aid allocation question is that this literature 
in turn compares the actual allocation with the (more) “optimal” one. This comparison makes 
clear that the aid allocation of many donors has been “suboptimal,” since, for a given amount of 
aid, the allocation does not achieve its maximum impact.  This in turn suggests that international 
economic and geopolitical factors (or other, unknown factors) remain important in bilateral aid 
allocations.   
                                                 
3 Dollar and Levin (2006) also investigate sensitivity of aid with respect to democracy which they find has been 
present consistently. 
4 See also Nunnenkamp and Thiele (2006) for a more recent analysis along the same lines.  
5 Note that we do not try to review the very large literature on the impact of aid: see rather Easterly (2003), 
McGillivray et alii (2006), or Rajan and Subramanian (2005); an earlier review is Mark McGillivray (2004). See 
also Anderson and Waddington (2006), Radelet (2006) and Easterly (2006) for recent reviews of the literature, 
focusing on changes in the new aid architecture and the MDGs. 6 
 
The studies nevertheless support the view that there has been some revisiting, as the more recent 
behavior of some of the donors comes closer to being “optimal”.  This may be in part because 
some donors now explicitly use these models to determine their aid allocations. Benefiting from 
the lessons of policy research, bilateral agencies like the UK DFID and the Netherlands 
development ministry have been using these models since the mid-1990s; and for longer time, 
multilateral institutions have used such models to drive their aid programs (see Easterly, 2003 
and Wood, 2006).  This may have improved the patterns of aid allocations. Obviously, results 
very much depend on the criteria used for optimal behaviore.g., growth, poverty, the flow of 
foreign direct investment received, gross primary school enrolment, infant mortality rateand 
on the specific estimation methods on the impact of aid.
6  As such, there is still considerable 
debate (see further McGillivray 2004; and Wood, 2006). Also, the literature has since expanded 
and now considers country factors such as sound institutions and human rights record among 
those potentially driving optimal aid (these factors may in part be motivated by their indirect 
impacts on the MDGs, especially those other than poverty). Recent papers along these lines 
include Gates and Hoeffler (2006), and Amprou, Guillaumont and Guillaumont Jeanneney 
(2007).
7   
 
While the existing research has highlighted the role of changing circumstances and the fall of the 
Berlin wall, changes have not just been triggered by global economy and geopolitical changes. 
There have also been many changes in the forms in and rules under which official aid is being 
provided, that is, the international aid architecture more narrowly defined. Common adaptations 
are that individual donors have been introducing more openness in the allocation of their aid, 
aiming at more selectivity, and introducing greater implicit and explicit use of benchmarks and 
results-based allocations (such as in the US Millennium Challenge Account).  Many donors have 
moved to substitute debt-type flows by concessional aid (grants instead of loans); in some cases, 
donors have altered their mix of balance-of-payments/budget support and project financing; and 
(almost) all donors have engaged in bilateral (official) debt reduction, in the latest round through 
the (enhanced) HIPC initiative with 100% write-offs. Furthermore, additional multilateral debt 
reduction has been set in progress through the MDRI (Multilateral Debt Reduction Initiative).  
 
                                                 
6 For example, one optimization can be with respect to aid impact on current poverty, given policy choices in the 
country. Another optimization might be with respect to aid impact on policy, given policies’ impact on future 
poverty in the country. The first, say, may lead donors to give more aid to countries where there is more poverty and 
where the impact of aid on poverty is larger (because the policy environment is better). The second may lead donors 
to take a longer-term view, and try to through their aid-policies induce better policies, such as better governance and 
greater accountability, that leads to lower poverty in the longer term. 
7 Gates and Hoeffler (2006) analyze, for example, whether Nordic aid agencies allocated aid over the period 1980-
1999 different from how other countries did. They find that the Nordic countries differ significantly from other 
donors as they gave more to democracies and do not give to political allies. 7 
Since earlier work has shown that aid flows used to be a function of the levels and structure of a 
country’s obligations, including its debt stock outstanding to the multilateral financial institutions 
(Birdsall et al. 2003), these debt reductions may have affected the amounts and relative 
destinations of bilateral aid flows. Some studies have further investigated aspect of defensive 
lending, i.e., the role of debt in triggering certain aid and debt disbursements. Marchesi and 
Missale (2004), for example, examine both grants and net loans made to a panel of 55 both 
HIPC-and non-HIPC low-income countries during the last two decades to understand the main 
reasons that motivated the behavior of both donors and creditors. They find that the total amount 
of net transfers to HIPCs, as compared to non-HIPCs, have been increasing with their debt level. 
Greater net transfers have taken the form of net loans from multilateral organizations and grants 
in exchange for loans from bilateral institutions.  
 
With the model changing from additional aid flows to official debt reduction in the 1990s, some 
recent studies have investigated the motivations for debt relief. Chauvin and Kraay (2006) find 
that while debt relief, particularly from multilateral creditors, has been allocated to countries 
with better policies in recent years, somewhat surprisingly, conditional on per capita incomes 
and policy, more indebted countries are not much more likely to receive debt relief. However, 
countries that are large debtors especially vis-à-vis multilateral creditors are more likely to 
receive debt relief. Finally, they find that most of the persistence in debt relief is driven by 
slowly-changing country characteristics, indicating that it may difficult for countries to "exit" 




This evidence thus suggests that HIPCs have kept receiving large amounts of resources just 
because of their high indebtedness or large size, thereby supporting both the hypothesis of 
defensive lending and defensive granting. This result may potentially have important policy 
consequences as it provides an argument in favor of debt relief, and the HIPC and MDRI 
Initiative in particular, in that it helps ‘restore policy selectivity’. As such, now that (HIPC and 
MDRI) debt relief is being implemented in a growing number of countries, it is interesting to 
check to what extent debt relief has indeed been successful so far in eliminating defensive 
lending. More generally, the changes of aid composition and the growing importance of debt 
relief as an alternative aid instrument, or ‘aid modality’ (Collier, 2006), call for more attention to 
doing disaggregated analyses of aid allocation. Few though have studied the explicit changes that 
                                                 
8 Although we focus only on the determinants of aid, not on its impact, it is worth mentioning the work by Chauvin 
and Kraay (2005). They study the effect of debt reduction and debt relief on recipient government resources for 
development spending. Using a newly-constructed database measuring the present value of debt relief for 62 low-
income countries, they find little evidence that debt relief has affected the level and composition of public spending. 
They do not find evidence either that debt relief has raised growth, investment rates or the quality of policies and 
institutions among recipient countries. Although they cannot rule out a variety of data and statistical problems, their 
evidence does suggest that some skepticism is in order regarding the likely benefits of further large-scale debt relief.   8 
taken place as a consequence of the aid paradigm shift in general, and the debt reduction 
initiatives and PRSP mechanism in particular.
9  
 
Finally, a significant share of aid is allocated multilaterally, as in the case of the International 
Development Agency (IDA), managed by the World Bank, the Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility (PRGF) of the IMF, and programs of other multilateral financial institutions.
10 While we 
do not study multilateral aid allocations, the multilateral aspect does introduce some other 
dimensions. For example, much of bilateral official debt reschedulings and debt reductions 
occurs through multilateral forums (the Paris Club). This introduces some potential conflict of 
interests, such as IDA disbursements that can get influenced by the World Bank/IBRD financial 
positions. Or the heavy World Bank and IMF inputs into the Paris Club process, in turn often 
reflecting G7 and geopolitical inputs, may bias final outcomes. There is also strategic behavior 
among donors themselves that can be affected by the actions of multilateral financial institutions, 
such as aid disbursements (see Mavrotas and Villanger (2006) for a theoretical model with this 
property). As such, the framework for multilateral aid affects not only multilateral flows directly, 
but also bilateral flows. This is again important since there have been some changes in terms of 
the multilateral framework over the last few years. These have included changes in institutional 
arrangements, e.g., more openness regarding finances and decisions,  increased degrees of 
concessionality of multilateral flows and procedures, and more coordination in lending and 
disbursement policies. 
 
More generally, the international development architecture has been undergoing many changes 
in the last few years. This includes specific actions such as the Paris Declaration on 
Harmonization and Alignment of aid flows. Other, broader but related new ‘institutional’ 
mechanisms include the greater use of PRSPs, the explicit introduction of MDGs and the broader 
objective of scaling up aid, and other, institutional environment changes. All of these 
institutional and policy changes and the actual bilateral and multilateral debt reduction can be 
expected to affect the allocation among countries and the mix between aid and official capital 
flows for individual countries.   
 
The exact effects of these and other changes in the design of the multilateral framework for 
allocating aid on actual allocation are not clear a priori, however, and have certainly not been 
studied much. Do these changes really lead donors to provide aid money in a more rational 
manner? Is there less influence of (geo-) political factors today, is there more selectivity today, 
does this differ by groups of donors and is there a relationship with institutional changes? Does 
                                                 
9 Aid disaggregation approaches have become more popular, especially in fiscal response studies (of aid). See 
Mavrotas (2005) for a recent review of this literature. See also Cassimon and Van Campenhout (2006) who analyze 
the long-term fiscal response of HIPC debt relief compared to that of donor grants or loans.   
10 Altogether there are some 20 multilateral financial agencies, providing around 32% of total net aid transfers 
(using Roodman’s definition) in 2003. 9 
the substitution of grants for loans by specific donors lead to better allocation as there are fewer 
conflicts between the collection on past loans and the extension of new support?  Or does the 
provision of grants lead to a moral hazard on the part of the specific donors as they are less 
concerned about the long-term prospects and viability of countries?  These are some of the 
questions we will investigate. 
 
II.   DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
We want to investigate whether institutional and other changes at the bilateral and multilateral 
levels have led to significantly different ways in which (bilateral) aid is being allocated. We 
specifically want to study whether there have been changes in the process of allocation of aid 
over time, whether the granting of debt reduction (HIPC) and the adoption of PRSP for specific 
countries affects aid flows, whether the aid allocation is less affected by defensive lending over 
time, and whether there are differences among donors in the aid allocation process. In this 
section, we describe the data sources, data, and the methodology we use to investigate these 
questions. 
 
A.   Data sources and data 
Table 1 provides a detailed list of variables used, their description and their sources.  Data on 
official development assistance (ODA, including debt reduction) for each of the reporting donors 
to each recipient country in a specific year come from the OECD/DAC (Development Assistance 
Committee) database. While the OECD/DAC database does not include all bilateral donors 
(China is not a reporting member, for example), it does cover the bulk of international aid flows 
over the period.  In terms of recipient countries, we restrict our analysis to developing countries, 
i.e., those countries on what was known until recently as the Part I list of countries of the DAC 
(as of January 1
st 2001). Countries included on the Part II list of the DAC, receiving what is 
traditionally called Official Aid (OA), are either transition countries or more advanced countries 
(such as Israel or South Korea) and are excluded from our analysis. Data are obtained from the 
On-line CRS system of OECD/DAC, with bilateral donor-recipient transactions captured through 
the so-called DAC Table 2a data, which also allow for some disaggregation by type of aid flow 
(grants, loans and debt relief). Altogether the aid data are a three-dimensional panel of ODA 
flows to 147 recipient countries from 22 bilateral donors for the period 1970-2004.  
 
The DAC statistics generally focus on the concept of net aid, which is total resources provided 
by donors in the form of grants, loans and debt relief, net of any loan principal repayments the 
country makes to the donor. In our analysis, we will use actual disbursements rather than 
commitments. Contrary to many earlier studies, we do not use the net ODA data, but transform 
the net aid figures into net aid transfers, by taking into account interest payments on the loans, to 
account for total net resource transfers. The total net aid transfer concept we use is thus defined 
in the following way:  
  10 
Net aid transfer = total (bilateral) ODA grants + total (bilateral) ODA loans extended to 
recipients – ODA loan amortization by recipients – interest paid by recipient 
 
In the econometric analysis, we focus on net aid transfer, scaled by recipient population, as the 
basic dependent variable. We relate this bilateral aid flow to a number of independent variables. 
We obtain macroeconomic variables mainly from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI).  Data on policy and institutional environment as well as on specific linkages 
between donors and recipients come from a variety of sources.  And we use the DAC aid data 
itself to create aid measures that are independent of the bilateral aid flows that we study. The 
independent control variables we include are commonly used by others in this literature: bilateral 
trade flows (to explore the role of non-aid economic relations between both countries), net aid 
provided by other donors (to explore the role of aid coordination), and total aid provided by the 
specific donor to all countries (to control for the overall level of aid generosity of the donor 
country).  
 
In terms of our main variables of interest, the “need” or ‘poverty selectivity’ element of aid is 
proxied by using the recipient country’s per capita income (in constant US dollars) lagged one 
period to limit endogeneity—of aid flows driving GDP, with poorer countries expected to 
receive more aid.  The ‘policy’ selectivity dimension of aid is explored by using the World Bank 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index of the recipient country. This index is 
available for a large number of developing countries and for a long period of time.
11 We also 
want to explore changes in the small country effect found in the aid literature, where we proxy 
size using recipient country population. To check for defensive lending practices, we use data on 
the countries’ debt stocks (relative to exports) and debt composition.  For debt stocks, since 
nominal debt stocks can be quite misleading as a measure of debt burden given the highly 
concessional interest rates, we use the present value of debt using a new, comprehensive time 
series of present value of debt calculated at the World Bank for a large number of countries, and 
also used in Chauvin and Kraay (2005, 2006).
12 For debt composition, we use the share of 
bilateral and multilateral claims in total claims at each point in time, to investigate whether large 
shares of bilateral and multilateral debt affect new aid flows, as has been found in the past 
(Birdsall et al., 2003; Marchesi and Missale, 2004).
13   These data come from the World Bank’s 
Global Development Finance database. 
                                                 
11 We also used other institutional environment indexes, such as the governance and corruption indexes produced by 
Kaufmann, et al. (2004, 2005) and the law and order indexes of Freedom House. We did not use alternative proxies 
for aid effectiveness brought forward in the recent aid literature, such as compliance with MDG targets, reduced 
vulnerability to external shocks, better governance and greater accountability, or greater democracy (see for 
example, Amprou et al., 2007).   
12 See also Dikhanov (2004) for the technical background document.   
13 This analysis can easily be expanded to consider whether the intra-bilateral debt composition affects the bilateral 
flows, such as the question whether bilaterals engage in defensive lending to a country when they have relatively 
larger claims outstanding.   11 
 
We also want to explore the role of colonial and geopolitical links since these have been found to 
affect aid flows.  For example, colonizers tend to give more aid to their former colonies, and 
political motivations have been found to drive aid flows, e.g., aid is being given to induce 
favorable votes in the UN. We therefore include in all regressions dummies for former colonial 
linkages (e.g., UK with Nigeria), and an index of the degree to which a recipient countries can be 
considered geopolitical friends of major donors.
14  Since we include in our regressions already 
pair-wise donor-recipient dummies (see next section), we already account for any potentially 
specific, strategic donor-recipient links, such as the well-known cases of US-Egypt and US-
Pakistan bilateral relations.   
 
To check whether structural changes in the nineties have affected aid allocations and their 
relationship to our need and selectivity measures, we split the sample into three sub-samples, 
1970-89, 1990-1998 and 1999-2004, and use period dummies for each. This first period is 
similar to earlier studies and coincides with the period before the fall of the Berlin wall. The 
second and third periods reflect the post-Berlin wall era; this period is split into two sub-periods 
to check whether indeed a new aid architecture has emerged in recent years, as a consequence of 
the new literature on aid effectiveness and the changes in the institutional aid set-up, all starting 
in the late nineties (for example, the World Bank Aid study in 1998; the launch of the 
HIPC/PRSP framework). We interact these three period dummies with the relevant aid 
effectiveness variables — poverty (per capita income), policy (CPIA), small country effect 
(population) and defensive aiding (debt) — to check for structural breaks. Additionally, we 
interact these four variables with dummies for every year to provide the year-by-year evolution 
over time of the sensitivities, as done by Sundberg and Gelb (2006) for the poverty and policy 
dimensions. We also do these year-by-year interactions for the colonial and geopolitical linkages 
variables.  
 
To investigate recipient-country specific recent institutional aid architecture changes, we use 
HIPC-dummies at the individual country level (using the enhanced HIPC decision point as the 
year) and PRSP-dummies at the date of full PRSP by the recipient country (using the dates as 
published by the IMF/World Bank). We also interact these HIPC and PRSP dummies with the 
poverty, policy, size and debt burden variables, to see whether there have been changes in 
selectivity and effectiveness following these actions. Furthermore, to investigate whether there 
are differences in aid allocation processes among donors and whether the aid architecture has 
involved changes at the donor level over time, we also explore the variation among donors in 
                                                 
14 The degree of ‘friends of the donor’ is defined dependent on the number of times the recipient has voted in the 
same manner in the UN.  The data on friends cover the following  donors: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, UK, and USA. Data are those used by Alesina and Weder (2002), 
with thanks to Beatrice Weder for providing us with the data.  12 
their sensitivities with respect to the most important dimensions—poverty, policy, size and debt 
burden. We do so within the panel regression, where in addition we also allow for time variation.   
 
B.   Methodology 
We have panel data with donor, recipient and time dimensions. One issue facing all aid studies is 
that for many donor-recipient country combinations aid flows are zero. This may introduce a 
selection bias which can arise for two reasons: on the donor side, for example, as little is known 
about the country and therefore it gets no aid; or on the recipient side, for example, as there is no 
interest in engaging with that particular donor country. In either case, no aid is being extended.  
Treating this observation as “zero aid” can bias our regression results, but a Tobit analysis can 
account for this fact. Two other methods are a probit in the first regression followed by a 
regression results with the Heckman inverse Mill’s ratio obtained from the first step; or just 
using only non-zero observations in a simple OLS regression framework.  Another econometric 
challenge is that there can be changes in aid budgets from year to year.  To account for this, we 
can allow for time-varying effects for each pair of donor and year, which means we would end 
up using random effects panel estimations to avoid possible bias when using fixed effects (see 
Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) for details on this estimation technique).   
 
We face thus a number of econometric choices. However, as Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) and 
Berthélemy (2006) have shown, the differences between fixed effects using non-zero 
observations only, Heckman, Heckman two stage using all observations, random effects or OLS 
are small.  To avoid presenting multiple results, we therefore choose to conduct fixed effects 
panel regression results using the non-zero observations only. This means that besides our 
recipient country control variables and bilateral relationship dummies to account for political and 
economic factors, we should include fixed effects at the bilateral donor-recipient level to account 
for any donor-recipient specific time invariant effect. We also include time (year) dummies to 
capture any large variation across time.   
 
When using fixed effects, however, another important problem is introduced. It relates to the 
nature of aid allocation, which is focused on bilateral pairwise relations and as such is similar to 
explaining trade in gravity-type models.  The possibility then arises of fixed effects driving the 
regression results. A natural candidate for an empirical model would be one that explains 
bilateral aid flows at time t by matrix of explanatory variables, a fixed donor effect, a fixed 
recipient effect and time dummies: 
 
(1)   
 
 
This is essentially the three way model proposed by Matyas (1997) in the context of gravity 
models as an alternative to the pooled OLS model that does not allow for unobserved 
heterogeneity.  Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) show that when (1) is extended to include bilateral 
interaction effects such as: 
 
(2)    
ijt ijt i j t ijt a x α β φ γ θ ε = + + + + +
ijt ijt i j ij t ijt a x α β φ γ µ θ ε = + + + + + +13 
 
   
this generalization of the three way model is in fact identical to a two way model with only time 
and bilateral effects: 
 
  ijt t ij ijt ijt x a ε θ µ β α + + + + =   (3)   
 
They argue that the original Matyas model of (1) is likely to be mis-specified, since “it does not 
span the whole vector space of possible treatments of explaining variations in bilateral trade (or 
aid) and ignoring such bilateral trade (or aid) interactions may lead to biased estimation” (see 
also Baltagi, Egger & Pfaffermayr, 2003).  In general, fixed effects accounts for any time 
invariant historical, geographical, political, cultural or other influence which will lead to 
deviations from the ‘normal’ aid (or trade) flows. However, specification (1) only takes into 
account such effects for the receiver (e.g., Tanzania receives more aid than other similar 
countries) and the donor (e.g., Denmark gives more aid than similar countries).  It does not take 
into account the specific effect that Denmark gives more aid to Tanzania than similar country 
pairs.  To do so, we need to estimate equation (3). 
 
Equation (3) can best be estimated as a panel, with the individual specific effects either regarded 
as fixed effects or as random effects. Both methods have their problems: estimating (3) using 
random effects assumes that all explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the individual 
specific effects. This may be unrealistic in the empirical problem at hand. This is not an issue in 
the fixed effects model since it eliminates any individual specific effects. However, a fixed 
effects regression eliminates everything that is time invariant from the model. This is a pity, 
because in the context of this study, we are interested in the marginal effects of some time 
invariant factors. For instance, it may be instructive to check whether country pairs with colonial 
ties—a time invariant bilateral fixed factor—receive more or less aid. 
 
Hausman and Taylor (1981) derive an instrumental variables estimator that can be considered to 
be in between a fixed and a random effects approach since it allows some variables to be 
correlated with the individual specific effects but still allows for the estimation of time invariant 
effects. In their model, exogenous variables (both time varying and time invariant) serve as their 
own instruments, time-varying endogenous effects (in the sense that they are correlated with 
individual specific effects) are instrumented by their deviation from individual means (as in the 
fixed effects approach) and time invariant endogenous effects are instrumented by individual 
averages of time varying exogenous variables. As such, the Hausman-Taylor model allows the 
estimation of time invariant effects, without imposing the strong assumption that all variables 
should be uncorrelated with the individual specific effects.  Moreover, fixed effects would be 
inefficient if some of the variables are uncorrelated with the individual specific effects, since 
they are instrumented needlessly. A nice additional feature of the Hausman-Taylor model is that 
instruments can be derived within the model. 
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As such, we argue that the Hausman-Taylor model is our preferred model. The main challenge in 
this model is deciding which of the variables are correlated with the individual specific effects 
and which are not. For this, Hausman and Taylor (1981) suggest using economic intuition. It is 
useful to realize that the individual specific effects are the proportions of the errors that contain 
country pair specific elements not included in the model. In other words, if a variable is possibly 
correlated with other political, social, historical, cultural or economic aspects not included in the 
model, it is probably endogenous. In our specification, lagged GDP per capita, net aid per capita 
provided by other donors, lagged trade as a share of GDP and the CPIA are considered 
endogenous. Furthermore, our ‘friends of the donor’ indicator is considered a time invariant 
endogenous variable, while the colonial ties indicator is a time invariant exogenous one.  
 
As already outlined, to check for structural breaks due to the changes in the institutional 
environment in the nineties, we use three sub-period dummies as well as year-specific dummies, 
and interact both set of dummies with the effectiveness proxies (poverty, policy, defensive 
lending and population). At the individual recipient country level, as noted, we consider simple 
pre- and post-HIPC dummies and pre- and post-PRSP dummies as proxies for recent changes in 
the aid architecture. Additionally, we interact again these dummies with the four effectiveness 
variables.  Finally, we are interested whether there are differences among donors and whether the 
aid architecture has involved changes at the individual donor level.  We therefore allow for 
donor-specific sensitivities in terms of the most important variables within the panel regression 
setup and allow these coefficients to change over time within our panel regression. 
 
Besides the Hausman-Taylor model, we conducted other robustness tests (not reported).  First, 
we ran the fixed effects panel regressions most others have. We also run the regressions with all 
observations, including zeros. We do not report the results as they are qualitatively similar, but 
econometrically less well motivated. Second, our panel regression results are also dependent—in 
terms of their statistical advantage over other regression techniques—on the degree of 
homogeneity in the data: with much heterogeneity, the panel approach offers little gains and 
possibly some costs. We thus need to consider whether we have homogeneity in our three 
dimensions: over time, and across donors and recipients. The possibilities are many, though: in 
the behavior of aid flows to different recipients, variation across donors and over time, etc. and 
we can not check for all of them.  
 
In terms of recipient countries, we run the aid allocation regressions by groups of similar-like 
recipients, grouping them by income level, score on the CPIA index, and size of country.  It is 
somewhat easier to check whether we have homogeneity in the donor dimension, since we have 
fewer donors than recipients.  We do this in several ways: we check the heterogeneity of the 
sensitivity of the bilateral aids flows in terms of the most important variables—poverty, policy, 
size and debt burden—by running individual aid allocation regressions for each donor separately; 
and by running the aid allocation regressions by groups of similar-like donors.  Most of these 
results confirmed the general panel regression results (which we report next), although with 
generally reduced statistically significance.  The most important exception is of course that the 15 
respective variables by which we group countries are not as statistically significant (e.g., when 
we group recipients by level of income, income is no longer as significant). For space reasons, 
we do not report these robustness results. 
 
  
III.   EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This section discusses the empirical results of our aid allocation analysis. We first provide some 
descriptive statistics and stylized facts, followed by a detailed discussion of the results for the 
main specifications used. As noted, we derive the results using the non-zero observations-only 
and using the Hausman-Taylor model.  
 
A.   Descriptive statistics  
Figure 1 shows the development of the bilateral net ODA transfers over time, measured in US 
dollars in year 2000 constant prices, including the total as well as the disaggregation into its 
grant, loan and debt relief components
15. Figure 2 presents the same data, but now on a recipient 
country per capita basis. Both figures show the aggregate evolution of our dependent variable. 
Figure 1 shows the increase of aid in the eighties, followed by a drop in aid volume in constant 
prices from the mid nineties on, and a recovery from around 1998 on, with total aid volume 
reaching close to the early nineties peak in 2004. When disaggregating the total aid volume, it is 
clear that over time, grants have replaced loans, with net loan transfers becoming negative in 
recent years. Debt relief largely accounts for the short-lived peak in aid volume in 1991, as well 
as for most of the increase in volume in the most recent years. Figure 2 shows that in per capita 
terms, net aid transfer remains within a fairly limited bound for the whole period, ranging 
between 6 and 8 (constant) dollar per person over the full period, with again an outlier in the 
mid-1990s.  It thus shows that changes in the absolute volume of aid over time largely match the 
increases of recipient population over time, although in most recent years, aid per capita has not 
recovered to its mid-1990s level. Also, as a larger share consist of debt relief granted, net 
transfers may be even lower.  
 
Table 2 provides the raw statistics for the dependent and independent variables used in the 
analysis. We find that the average net aid transfer provided by a donor to each recipient was $2.4 
per capita per year, but with a large variation (the minimum being -$138 and the maximum being 
                                                 
15 The disaggregation is made using the following decomposition. The grant component of net aid transfers is 
defined as total bilateral grants, netted of debt forgiveness grants. The loan component equals net loan transfers 
(corrected for offsetting entries on debt relief), including interest payments, but netted of interest payments forgiven. 
The debt relief components sums debt forgiveness grants (netted of the offsetting entries on debt relief) and interest 
payments forgiven. The component ‘offsetting entries on debt relief’ refers to the amortization part of debt 
forgiveness, that has to be deducted, congruent with the net aid logic of DAC ODA statistics, in order to avoid 
double counting of amortization forgiveness in ODA statistics in future years. See e.g. Global Monitoring Report 
2007 (table 4.1, p.153) for details on DAC debt relief accounting.     16 
$9052 per capita per year, a small country that received large aid from a single donor in a single 
year.  If we exclude the zero observations, average aid per capita per donor stands at $3.8 ($4 
excluding also the negative entries). Of the total net aid transfer, grants was the largest 
component, on average per donor some $2.2 per capita per year including zeros, while net loans 
per donor were some $0.16 per capita per year, and debt relief being granted per donor was $0.04 
per capita per year (not reported).  
 
In terms of the other, explanatory variables, the raw statistics are as expected and indicate the 
large variations among countries. Recipients’ GDP per capita (in 2000 prices) averages some 
$3900, but varies from less than $500 to $23266, with the latter being very high and surely not a 
country in need of aid. The average population size is some 2.8 million, but the standard 
deviation is high, 11.8 million, and the smallest is 20,000 people and the largest is some 1.3 
billion (China), with no countries in the middle segment between 300 million and 1 billion 
people.  For this reason, population is added in log terms in the regressions. 
 
Total aid provided by donors other than the specific donor for the specific recipient country was 
on average some $32 per capita per year, with a high of some $9,567 per capita in a single year, 
again the small country. Since donors on average provided some $309 in net aid transfer per 
capita (using the population of the recipient country) to all other countries in the same year, it 
means that the average country received about 9% of an individual donor’s total aid budget 
($32/($309+$32)). It shows that donors are still relatively fragmented in their aid allocation 
across countries.  
 
Bilateral donor-recipient country trade as a percentage was on average 2.2% of recipient country 
GDP, but again with large variation. The average CPIA index was 3.46, but shows significant 
variation as the index goes from a low of 0.72 to the CPIA maximum of 6, with a standard 
deviation of 0.88.  The debt burden, measured in present value terms, was on average 181% of 
exports, but varied from less than 1% to a high of 6500% of exports. The bilateral share of total 
debt was on average 38% and the multilateral share some 33%, showing the importance of these 
two forms of official financing in total external financing.  About 2% of countries had a PSRP 
and a similar 2% of countries had passed the HIPC decision point by end 2004.   
 
B.   Regression results  
In discussing the various analyses, we proceed as follows. In Table 3, we present the basic aid 
allocation model, allowing not only for the conventional ‘poverty’ and ‘policy’ selectivity-
related explanatory variables and other conventional control variables (including the small 
country effect), but also adding explanatory variables related to the defensive lending (and 
granting) hypothesis. Also in this Table, we use period dummies that split the sample in three 
sub-periods to check for structural breaks, and interact these period dummies with the four 
effectiveness proxies. We also use annual interaction dummies and graphically present these as 
trends. In Table 4, we report the effects of recent changes in the aid architecture at the country 17 
level (HIPC and PRSP dummies), including interactions between the country changes (HIPC and 
PRSP dummies) and the policy and lending variables. We use every time the total net aid 
transfer per capita provided by each donor to each recipient as the dependent variable, where the 
net aid measure captures the net amount of resources provided to a country, i.e., the flows of 
grants, net loans, debt relief (including items such as technical assistance, emergency and food 
aid), incorporating also, where appropriate, interest payments paid by the recipient to the donor. 
All regression results presented in Tables 3-4 also use only observations with non-zero 
dependent variables and for which we also have all independent variables, leaving us with some 
45,000 observations.   
 
The basic aid allocation model  
We start with reporting the results for the standard regressions for the allocation of bilateral aid, 
largely following the specification used by many others (Table 3).  From the first regression 
results (Table 3, column 1), we confirm the standard finding that the income level and the size of 
the recipient country matters, with wealthier and larger countries receiving less aid. We also find 
that the more aid a donor gives in general, the less it gives to any specific country. And we see 
that aid by one donor is positively affected by the aid behavior of other donors, hinting at 
complementarity among donors, possibly due to signaling or better coordination. We confirm the 
results of others that the openness of the country to (bilateral) trade matters with countries with 
whom the donor trades more intensively receiving more aid.  We also confirm that colonial and 
geopolitical linkages can drive bilateral aid flows. All these variables are statistically significant. 
 
Importantly, we find that on aggregate and over the whole period donors are providing aid taking 
into account the quality of the policy and institutional environment in the recipient country, as 
measured by the CPIA, albeit only at a 10% level of statistical significance. Again, this confirms 
studies by others that donors consider the policy and institutional environment of the recipient in 
their aid allocations, with the stronger effects found for the more recent period. 
 
We next discuss whether debt stocks and debt compositions affect the bilateral aid flows to 
countries. First, from the base regression results (Table 3, column 1), we find that the present 
value of the debt owed by the country to all creditors combined relative to a country’s exports 
does not significantly affect the flow of net aid transfers to the country, nor does the share of 
bilateral debt in total debt. Multilateral debt share exerts some negative effects on debt flows. 
Contrary to earlier findings, these results do not seem to indicate the importance of a 
phenomenon of defensive lending driving aid flows over the whole period.
16    
 
                                                 
16 Earlier results using a log variant for positive aid observations did hint at defensive lending practices, so this issue 
seems to depend on specifications, also in our analysis.  18 
These results so far could be affected by the changes over time in the relationships.  The basic set 
up therefore also includes an analysis of any structural breaks in the key relationships. As 
explained, we do this by using dummies for three subperiods, before 1990, 1990-1998, and 1999-
2004, and interacting these with the key variables—GDP per capita, policy (CPIA), defensive 
lending (debt stock), and population—to see what extent the relations of aid with key 
determinants changes over the periods.  Table 3, column 2 to 5 provide the results for the 
changes in sensitivities.  
 
In terms of income, the results (Table 3, column 2) show that over time the responsiveness of aid 
to recipient country income has increased (in absolute terms): the coefficient evolves from -0.400 
to -0.595. This suggests that donors have become more focused on providing aid to the poorest 
countries, rather than say to their political allies or to countries with which they trade much. 
Other recent research (Easterly, 2006, Sundberg and Gelb, 2006, Amprou, 2007) confirms this 
finding.  
 
Next we find that the small country bias becomes smaller over time as the coefficient for 
population becomes less negative, becoming half in size from -1.279 to -0.635.  This decline 
may be because donors with the end of the cold war became less interested to support small 
countries to say, buy votes in the UN. Another trend that could potentially have been offsetting 
this reduced importance of the country effects is that some of the very largest countries have 
been able to tap into private external financial markets or otherwise were restricted in their aid 
flows (e.g., as they hit portfolio limits), which means large countries would have been receiving 
even less aid funds over time, thus making the coefficient more negative.  The fact that there is 
no offset, but rather a decline in the coefficient suggests an even sharper decline in the small 
country effect among donors.  
 
Very importantly, aid becomes much more responsive to policy (Table 3, column 4): from being 
insignificant in the first period, the coefficient becomes 0.244 in the second period, and then 
increases further to 0.897 in the most recent years. This empirical finding confirms Berthélemy 
and Tichit (2004), Dollar and Levin (2006), Roodman (2005), Sundberg and Gelb (2006), and 
others who find that there are (large) improvements over time in donors’ selectivity.  Dollar and 
Levin (2006), for example, find that, while ”in the second half of the 1980s, aid was allocated 
indiscriminately to well governed and poorly governed countries alike, at the same level of per 
capita income, today there is a clear tendency to allocate more assistance to poor countries that 
have reasonably good economic governance.”
17  It confirms the growing consensus in the aid 
community that donors take the policy and institutional environment of countries more into 
                                                 
17 Dollar and Levin (2006) find this relationship between aid and governance when they use the World Bank’s CPIA 
measure; the same relationship is found if alternatively an independent assessment of institutions is used. Roodman 
(2005) finds that donors’ selectivity standings by the 2005 CDI methodology have been relatively stable since 1995, 
but that refers more to the ranking of countries and not to their absolute degree of selectivity. 19 
account in their aid allocation in recent years.
18   It also explains why over the whole period we 
find that the coefficient for CPIA is only statistically significant at the 10% level. 
  
Regarding the defensive lending hypothesis, the coefficients on debt for the subperiods provide 
additional information. They suggest that if anything, the concerns about countries’ debt burdens 
have declined over the periods.  While in the early period, high debt was a reason behind lower 
levels of aid, as the coefficient was statistically significant negative, in the later periods aid flows 
were no longer significantly affected by the level of debt of the countries. This change does not, 
however, suggest defensive lending per se, for which we need to consider as well the 
composition of debt. 
 
We complemented the three sub-period analysis by running the basic set up including yearly 
time dummies interacted with our four key determinants, thus allowing for annual evolutions. 
Figures 3 to 6 provide the graphical representation of these trends. The figures include the 
significance band of the various parameters. The figures show very clearly the increase over time 
in responsiveness of aid regarding poverty and policy, and the decline in the role of country size 
and debt in determining aid flows.  Specifically, the coefficient for income decreases from -.4 to 
-.7, with the biggest drop in the early 1990s (note that the income sensitivity is always 
statistically significant different from zero). The coefficient for population moves up as well, 
with a sharper increase over the period from -1.5 to -0.5 (note that the population sensitivity is 
always statistically significant different from zero).  This means there is less of a small country 
bias during the latter part of the period. The coefficient for CPIA increases from 0 to 1.2, with 
the sharpest rise starting in the mid 1990 (note that the policy sensitivity was not statistically 
significant different from zero until the mid-1990s).  And the coefficient for debt increases from 
a low of -0.4 to about zero (and statistically insignificant from zero) in the late 1980s/early 
1990s, after which it remains stable.  This confirms that debt is no longer a detriment to aid 
flows, maybe in part due to the bilateral and multilateral debt reductions over this period. 
 
We can also consider the effects of changes in the role of colonial and the geopolitical linkages 
in aid flows (Figure 7 and 8). Here we find that there is a sharp decline in these factors as well 
over time, suggesting that aid is being allocated more according to economic criteria. 
Specifically, the coefficient for colonial linkages declines to a third, while the coefficient for the 
friends variable falls by about half.  Altogether, these results suggest that there have been large 
changes in the international aid architecture that have led to a more rational allocation of aid 
among countries depending on needs and selectivity. 
 
                                                 
18 A notable exception to this view is Easterly (2006) who argues that in his review of the evidence there is little or 
no sign of increased selectivity with respect to policy and institutions. 20 
Specific international aid architecture changes  
We next analyze how (recipient) country specific policy actions related to changes in the 
international aid architecture affect the aid flow behavior. We use two dummies: when a country 
adopted a PRSP and when it became eligible for the HIPC-initiative (as proxied by a HIPC II 
decision point agreement). We interact these dummies again with our standard country and 
policy variables. Table 4 summarizes the results, where the first regression repeats the results of 
Table 3.  
 
We find that there are positive effects on net aid flows of a country adopting a PRSP (Table 4, 
column 2) and when it becomes eligible for the HIPC (Table 4, column 8), since both dummy 
coefficients are statistically significant positive. This confirms that donors consider a PRSP a 
sign of a good development program and “reward” a country when it adopts a PRSP. It also 
shows that the reduction of debt through the HIPC-initiative is a positive one for aid flows.
19 
 
So far these results are as expected.  More interesting are the effects of these actions on the 
willingness and ability of donors to be selective with respect to our four key determinants of 
effectiveness, poverty, policy, defensive lending and population. We investigate this by 
interacting the PRSP or HIPC dummies with these four variables, while including the other 
determinants as well as the  PRSP or HIPC dummies independently in the regressions.  
With respect to PRSP, the results show an increased responsiveness to GDP when the country 
has a PRSP.  It shows that donors are willing to give more aid to the poorer countries when they 
have a PRSP; the same goes for the HIPC dummy (although the HIPC dummy itself is now 
negative, but insignificant). For the rest, once the country has a PRSP, aid does not seem extra 
responsive to policy, defensive lending or population. This goes also for the HIPC dummy, with 
the exception of policy responsiveness: the statistically significant sign for the HIPC dummy 
interacted with CPIA, together with the HIPC dummy itself becoming negative, suggests that 
CPIA matters very much for aid once countries have received HIPC debt reduction. As such, the 
debt reduction re-introduces or enhances selectivity in donors’ behavior.. It suggests that donors 
see the HIPC as an important signal on which basis they are willing to reward good policy more. 
 
As argued by some, the buildup of (multilateral) official debt in the earlier period made donors 
lose (part of) their selectivity, which seems to have been regainedand actually strengthened to 
a significant some degreeat the individual country level when the decision to get debts reduced 
is taken. The interactive dummies for the debt shares (Table 4, column 7 and 13) show clearly 
                                                 
19 Some caveats are in order here as to the beneficial impact on the country. Specifically, the increase in aid flows 
may come in different types, debt relief, debt flows, or grants. To the extent that aid flows are overestimated because 
debt relief is measured as net transfers, the HIPC debt reduction may led to a measured, but not real increase in aid 
flows. Furthermore, an increase in aid in the form of debt flows following debt reduction may be less beneficial 
since, as some have argued, the reduction in debt is just creating free headroom for others. See the discussion around 
the latest debt sustainability analysis, e.g. IDA&IMF (2006). 21 
that the adoption of a PSRP and the eligibility for HIPC reduce the importance of debt 
composition in aid flows, with the effects of a large multilateral debt share statistically 
significant for both PRSP and HIPC and the bilateral debt share statistically significant for the 
HIPC dummy.  It suggests that these specific actions lead to less defensive lending.  
 
Changes over time among donors 
From the regression results so far, we have found that there is a clear pattern of increased 
selectivity of donors over time and reduced influence of colonial and political factors. We also 
found some evidence that there are changes in the effects of debt on aid flows as they relate to 
the countries’ adoption of PRSP and eligibility for HIPC. This is good news for the international 
aid architecture in that more selectivity can enhance the development impact of aid.  In general, 
as already noted, other research also supports the view that donors have improved their 
selectivity and quality of aid.  In a very comprehensive assessment of donors’ attitude towards 
aid, the Center for Global Development’s Commitment to Development Index (see  Roodman, 
2005)—covering not only aid flows, but also investment, security and migration—shows for 21 
major donor countries—the same countries as in our sample except Luxembourg—an average 
improvement in the index (which runs from 10 between 2003 and 2006 (from 5.0 to 5.2).   
 
The question is whether we can identify, besides the general changes, particular changes at 
individual donors that may have contributed to the increased selectivity.  Existing research (e.g., 
Berthélemy, 2006; Dollar and Levin, 2006) has already highlighted the differences among 
donors in their interests in development, with some donors having more altruistic objectives 
while others have more geo-political interests. Dollar and Levin (2006) show that there were 
improvements among specific donors with respect to policy selectivity. And the Center for 
Global Development’s Commitment to Development Index suggests some convergence in general 
approaches, with the standard deviation in the index among donors going from 1.00 to 0.82 
between 2003 and 2006. The question is whether within our framework we also find evidence 
that these differences exist, whether they have also changed over time and for which donors 
specifically.  Analyzing these (changing) differences among donors within our empirical 
framework may help identify what institutional changes for which donor(s) have helped bringing 
about the overall changes. 
    
We conduct such an exercise by deriving the elasticities of individual donors with respect to our 
four key measures, poverty, policy, defensive lending and population.  We do this within our 
panel approach, thus keeping all other control variables the same for all donors, but allowing the 
coefficients for each donor to differ and to vary over the three time periods.  Table 5 reports the 
average of the coefficients for the three periods by donor, where the donors are sorted by the 
degree of sensitivity with respect to the CPIA variable. 
 
Table 5 shows the large differences among donors, with the sensitivity with respect to CPIA to 
vary between -0.59 for the United States to 0.91 for the United Kingdom, making the UK much 22 
more policy sensitive than the US.   In terms of GDP per capita, the average sensitivity varies 
from -3.34 for the United States to 0.65 for Japan, suggesting that the US aid is much more 
geared towards the poorest countries than Japan’s aid is.  In terms of population, the average 
sensitivity varies from -3.38 for the United Kingdom to -1.37 for Luxemburg, suggesting that the 
United Kingdom is more geared towards smaller countries. Finally, the average sensitivity with 
debt varies from -0.29 for France to 0.21 for the United States, suggesting that for France debt is 
more a detriment to aid flows than it is for the United States.   Not all these coefficients are 
statistically significant, however, so the results just provide a rough comparisons of the 
differences among donors. 
 
The detailed results for the individual donors also confirm the general improvement in selectivity 
over time.  The average sensitivities across the 22 donors for the three periods, reported in Table 
6, show an increase in sensitivity with respect to income, a sharp increase in sensitivity with 
respect to CPIA, a lowering of the bias towards smaller countries and a reduced concern over 
debt burdens.  The results thus suggest that, across the board, there has been an improvement in 
the selectivity of donors.  We also find that there is less variability among donors over time in 
the CPIA and the GDP per capita dimensions (as measured by a decline in the coefficient of 
variation, especially for the CPIA), suggesting that donors have become more homogeneous in 
their aid allocations and generally more focused on recipient countries’ progress and prospects 
with development.   
 
Figure 9 shows this improvement and sense of convergence for the four dimensions by plotting 
for each donor the coefficients for the three periods. The clearest is the general improvement in 
the CPIA dimension (top chart), followed by the GDP per capita dimension (second chart), 
where for many donors both sensitivities (in absolute values) were much higher in the late 1990s 
than before.  The progress is less obvious for the population (third chart) and debt (bottom chart) 
dimensions where the decline in coefficients is less consistent across the donors, and significant 
differences remain among donors in the degree of bias towards small countries and concerns 
over debt burdens. Nevertheless, they suggest some improvements and convergence in these last 
two dimensions as well. 
   
IV.   CONCLUSIONS 
We study how the behavior of bilateral aid flows to individual countries has changed over time 
and in responses to institutional changes. We observe behavioral changes over time in actual aid 
flows towards what appears to be more optimal allocations of resources across countries. 
Specifically, over time the role of poverty and the countries’ policy and institutional environment 
increases, and the small country effect slightly reduces. We like to conclude that these changes 
are related to changes in the overall institutional environment, the international aid architecture. 
The specific institutional environment and policy changes we can identify at the country level 
that led to more selectivity in donor flows are the adoptions of the HIPC and PRSP. These occur 
already after the fall of the Berlin Wall, but are intensified more recently, suggesting that 23 
changes in the aid architecture have led to (even) more selectivity in donor flows. While the role 
of debt burden in deterring aid flows has declined, we find little evidence of defensive lending 
driving overall flows. Debt relief, however, through the HIPC Initiative, combined with the 
adoption of PRSP program seem to have reduced the importance of the share of official (bilateral 
and multilateral) debt in determining aid flows.  
 
While these are very encouraging signs, we are left unsure as to what specific institutional 
changes, if any, at the international or donor level may have been driving these changes in 
behavior. We know there have been a number of changes in long-standing multilateral financial 
institutions—such as the Paris Club, IMF, World Bank, consultative group meetings etc.and 
we can suspect these changes have affected the behavior of bilateral aid flows as well. We also 
know that there has been more attention paid to aid allocation in the later 1990s, in part due to 
research started in the mid-1990s. But which of these changes specifically has had the beneficial 
impacts we find remains to be analyzed.  This is important though since further precision in the 
institutional factors driving changes in behavior would greatly help make the international 
financial system work better for developing countries. 
 
We do know, however, (and have confirmed again) that the behavior of individual donors differs 
as to their degree of altruism and selectivity relative to their geopolitical and own interests. This 
suggests that part of the reasons for the changes in behavior observed lie in the institutional 
environment in the donor country. We can get some more insights into this relationship when we 
correlate the donors’ score on the Commitment to Development Index with the various indexes 
of Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (KKM, 2004) of the donors’ institutional environments. The 
KKM indexes cover Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. We do this for the year 2004 and for 
the 21 countries for which we have data for both set of indexes. We find that there are strong 
positive correlations, i.e., those countries with more transparent and less corrupt environments 
tend to be more committed to development and provide aid in a more selective manner. 
Interestingly, the strongest correlation is with the voice and accountability index (0.86), followed 
by a strong correlation as well with the control of corruption index (0.76).  The lowest 
correlation is with political stability (0.54).  The correlation is somewhat less strong for the 
specific CDI quality of aid variable (correlation is 0.64; see Figure 10), perhaps suggesting that 
aid is somewhat less related to the overall institutional environment of the donor country and 
more related to the behavior of the specialized agencies involved in aid budgets and allocation.   
 
These findings nevertheless suggest that the way preferences of citizens in the donor country are 
taking into account matters for how aid get allocated; and a greater presence of corruption in the 
donor country seems to make selectively less likely. While this is admittedly a very crude 
analysis, it nevertheless suggests that the quality of aid and its allocation is not independent of 
the institutional environment in the donor country. As such, analysis and research of the 
international aid architecture needs to take into account not just the policy and institutional 
environment in the recipient countries, but also that in the donor countries. 24 
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Table 1. List of Variables, Description and Sources 
 
 
Net aid transfer pc = 
 





GDP per capita at PPP rates and in 2000 prices, 
lagged 1 year           
WDI 
cpia =  Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
score 
World Bank 
Log(population) =  the log of population  WDI 
Net aid others =  net aid per capita provided by all other donor  DAC 
Donor net aid sum =  the sum of net aid provided by the specific 
donor 
DAC 
PV debt =  the present value of debt as a ratio to exports of 




the sum of bilateral donor–recipient country 
exports and imports scaled by recipient country 




the share of multilateral debt in total debt  GDF/WDI 
Bilateral debt 
share= 
the share of bilateral debt in total debt  GDF/WDI 
hipc =  a dummy if the country passed the HIPC 
decision point 
Own 
prsp =  a dummy if the country adopted a PRSP  Own 
col=  a dummy taking the value of 1 if the donor 
country pair has colonial history 
Own 
friends =  An indicator between 0 and 100, mapping the 
degree to which recipient country votes in 
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       Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used (USD, unless indicated otherwise) 
                 
Dependent variable  Number  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Net aid transfer pc                              All                                     90516  2.39  42.89  -137.56  9052 
                                              Non-zeros                                                    56264  3.84  54.35  -137.56  9052 
Positive 53649  4.08  55.64  0.00  9052 
Independent variables           
Lagged GDP/capita  67980  3900.02  3363.25  466.20  23266 
Population  103972  2.8mn  11.8mn  19700  1.3 bn 
PV debt, % goods and services exports  75592  181.02  328.95  0.00  6510 
Net aid others  90516  32.49  108.02  -129.23  9567 
Donor net aid sum  90516  308.57  648.59  -18.57  10399 
Lagged bilateral trade, % of GDP  70621  2.20  12.22  0.00  1543 
CPIA  65252  3.46  0.88  0.72  6.00 
Multilateral debt share (%)  81114  32.63  23.62  0.00  100 
Bilateral debt share (%)  81114  38.30  23.12  0.00  100 
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Table 3.  Basic Regression Results  
                    
     base  Int gdp  Int pop  Int cpia  Int debt 
            
Lagged GDP/capita   -0.562**    -0.520**  -0.693**  -0.548** 
   (0.043)    (0.043)  (0.046)  (0.044) 
Log(population)   -0.892**  -1.004**    -0.917**  -0.891** 
   (0.098)  (0.12)    (0.1)  (0.098) 
Cpia   0.0856+  0.0928*  0.121**    0.0654 
   (0.045)  (0.044)  (0.045)    (0.045) 
PV debt   -0.0019  -0.0072  0.0156  0.00492   
   (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)   
Net aid others   7.244**  6.052**  1.5  5.609**  6.967** 
   (1.14)  (1.15)  (1.19)  (1.16)  (1.15) 
Donor net aid sum   -0.224**  -0.226**  -0.224**  -0.224**  -0.223** 
   (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047) 
Lagged bilateral trade   12.27**  12.25**  11.56**  12.13**  12.21** 
   (1.13)  (1.13)  (1.13)  (1.13)  (1.13) 
Multilateral debt share  -0.576+  -0.967**  0.0147  -0.395  -0.554+ 
   (0.34)  (0.34)  (0.34)  (0.34)  (0.34) 
Bilateral debt share   0.0428  0.244  0.161  0.0856  0.108 
   (0.27)  (0.27)  (0.27)  (0.27)  (0.27) 
Friends   0.105**  0.102**  0.105**  0.109**  0.104** 
   (0.016)  (0.02)  (0.018)  0.017)  (0.016) 
Colony   7.868**  7.865**  7.826**  7.840**  7.840** 
   (0.9)  (1.14)  (0.97)  (0.91)  (0.9) 
*dummy1970-1989   -0.400**  -1.279**  -0.0655  -0.0685** 
   (0.051)  (0.11)  (0.051)  (0.021) 
*dummy1990-1998   -0.542**  0.917**  0.244**  0.01 
   (0.048)  (0.11)  (0.067)  (0.012) 
*dummy1998-2004   -0.595**  -0.635**  0.897**  -0.00884 
     (0.044)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.03) 
Constant   12.35**  14.59**  17.91**  10.88**  12.43** 
   (1.80)  (2.24)  (1.93)  (1.93)  (1.81) 
Observations   45731  45731  45731  45731  45731 
Number of donrecID   2271  2271  2271  2271  2271 
                   
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1  
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Table 4.  Expanded Regression Results 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) 
Lagged GDP/capita  -0.562**  -0.560**  -0.562**  -0.558**  -0.557**  -0.560**  -0.558**  -0.550**  -0.548**  -0.553**  -0.553**  -0.551**  -0.548** 
  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.044) 
Log(population)  -0.892**  -0.919**  -0.910**  -0.917**  -0.918**  -0.912**  -0.921**  -0.924**  -0.909**  -0.931**  -0.927**  -0.930**  -0.926** 
  (0.098)  (0.100)  (0.098)  (0.100)  (0.100)  (0.100)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.100)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10) 
Cpia  0.0856+  0.0813+  0.0812+  0.0799+  0.0807+  0.0813+  0.0825+  0.0778+  0.0772+  0.0735+  0.0785+  0.0774+  0.0802+ 
  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.045) 
PV debtdod  -0.00186  -0.00039  -0.00030  -0.00029  -0.00026  -0.00055  0.00129  0.00155  0.00228  -0.00003  0.000706  0.00133  0.00447 
  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
Net aid others  7.244**  6.948**  6.920**  6.993**  6.966**  6.963**  6.845**  7.006**  6.831**  6.923**  6.974**  6.962**  6.861** 
  (1.14)  (1.15)  (1.15)  (1.15)  (1.15)  (1.15)  (1.15)  (1.15)  (1.15)  (1.15)  (1.15)  (1.15)  (1.15) 
Donor net aid sum  -0.224**  -0.224**  -0.224**  -0.224**  -0.224**  -0.224**  -0.224**  -0.225**  -0.224**  -0.225**  -0.225**  -0.225**  -0.225** 
  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047) 
Lagged bilateral trade  12.27**  12.24**  12.22**  12.24**  12.25**  12.23**  12.25**  12.25**  12.21**  12.22**  12.23**  12.26**  12.24** 
  (1.13)  (1.13)  (1.13)  (1.13)  (1.13)  (1.13)  (1.13)  (1.13)  (1.13)  (1.13)  (1.13)  (1.13)  (1.13) 
Multilat. debt share  -0.576+  -0.871*  -0.870*  -0.857*  -0.856*  -0.870*  -0.862*  -0.782*  -0.771*  -0.808*  -0.810*  -0.779*  -0.786* 
  (0.34)  (0.35)  (0.35)  (0.35)  (0.35)  (0.35)  (0.35)  (0.34)  (0.34)  (0.34)  (0.34)  (0.34)  (0.35) 
Bilat. debt share  0.0428  0.0882  0.0612  0.0867  0.0934  0.0838  0.148  0.0802  0.0629  0.106  0.0828  0.0902  0.174 
  (0.27)  (0.27)  (0.27)  (0.27)  (0.27)  (0.27)  (0.27)  (0.27)  (0.27)  (0.27)  (0.27)  (0.27)  (0.27) 
Friends  0.105**  0.105**  0.107**  0.105**  0.104**  0.106**  0.105**  0.106**  0.106**  0.105**  0.106**  0.104**  0.106** 
  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017) 
Colony  7.868**  7.865**  7.856**  7.863**  7.882**  7.869**  7.861**  7.838**  7.840**  7.844**  7.843**  7.852**  7.833** 
  (0.90)  (0.92)  (0.90)  (0.92)  (0.92)  (0.92)  (0.92)  (0.95)  (0.92)  (0.95)  (0.95)  (0.96)  (0.94) 
Prsp    0.605**  0.151  -1.187  0.515+  1.843  3.149*             
    (0.16)  (0.27)  (1.71)  (0.26)  (2.25)  (1.46)             
Hipc                0.503**  -0.0621  -2.549+  0.799**  -0.912  4.414** 
                (0.15)  (0.25)  (1.44)  (0.28)  (2.26)  (1.54) 
*Lagged GDP/capita      0.261*            0.412**         
      (0.12)            (0.14)         
*cpia        0.513            0.900*       
        (0.49)            (0.42)       
*PV debt          0.0437            -0.106     
          (0.10)            (0.085)     
*log(population)            -0.0761            0.0873   
            (0.14)            (0.14)   
*multilat debt share              -2.366            -3.820* 
              (1.53)            (1.61) 
*bilat debt share              -3.446*            -4.686** 
              (1.73)            (1.74) 
Constant  12.35**  12.80**  12.27**  12.42**  12.83**  12.34**  12.80**  12.49**  12.24**  12.63**  12.56**  12.98**  12.47** 
  (1.80)  (1.83)  (1.80)  (1.83)  (1.84)  (1.83)  (1.84)  (1.87)  (1.83)  (1.88)  (1.87)  (1.90)  (1.87) 
Observations  45731  45731  45731  45731  45731  45731  45731  45731  45731  45731  45731  45731  45731 
Number of donrecID  2271  2271  2271  2271  2271  2271  2271  2271  2271  2271  2271  2271  2271 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Table 5. Donor Specific Sensitivities With Respect to Country Variables 
     (Average three periods; data are sort by the sensitivity w.r.t. CPIA)   
                  
    GDP  CPIA  POP  PVDOD    
             
 United States  -3.34  -0.59  -1.7  0.21    
 Italy  0.29  -0.21  -2.4  0.1    
 Luxembourg  -0.46  -0.04  -1.37  -0.02    
 New Zealand  0.06  0.22  -1.49  -0.02    
 Norway  -0.51  0.24  -1.56  0.03    
 Finland  -0.06  0.25  -1.52  0.02    
 Austria  -0.13  0.25  -3.03  -0.05    
 Netherlands  -0.02  0.27  -2.75  -0.04    
 Sweden  -0.44  0.31  -1.7  0.06    
 Canada  -0.74  0.33  -2.71  -0.08    
 France  -1.32  0.34  -3.01  -0.29    
 Ireland  0.02  0.34  -1.52  -0.03    
 Switzerland  -0.09  0.35  -1.53  0    
 Greece  0.2  0.43  -1.55  -0.07    
 Denmark  -0.15  0.47  -1.53  -0.01    
 Japan  0.65  0.51  -2.79  0.05    
 Portugal  0.12  0.51  -2.7  -0.04    
 Belgium  -0.47  0.65  -2.66  -0.24    
 Australia  -0.31  0.66  -3.13  -0.03    
 Germany  -0.76  0.72  -2.93  -0.17    
 Spain  -0.28  0.82  -1.61  0.05    
 United Kingdom  -2.19  0.91  -3.38  -0.16    
              
             
             
 
 
Table 6. Average Sensitivity 
 
Period   GDP  CPIA  POP  DOD 
pre 90  -0.348  -0.076  -2.554  -0.077 
90-99  -0.474  0.220  -2.191  -0.006 
post 99  -0.518  0.876  -1.929  -0.013  
33 
































                                         





                       Figure 2. Recipient Country Per Capita Bilateral Net ODA Transfers to 


































                   Source: author’s calculations based on DAC on-line CRS data and World Bank 
                  WDI population figures. 
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                                 Figure 3. Evolution of Responsiveness of Aid to Countries’ Income 
 
   
 








Figure 6. Evolution of Responsiveness of Aid to Countries’ Debt 
  
36 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 10. Relationship between KKM Voice and Accountability and the  










































Voice and Accountability Linear (Voice and Accountability)
R
2 = 0.64
 
 
 
 